typically supplied small loans of a few guilders, which the loan banks could not or would not handle for reasons of cost and space. 11 Repeated attempts to bridle pawnbroking with new legislation foundered in Parliament until it finally passed the Pawnshop Act of 1910. 12 This Act acknowledged usury and the rising number of pawnshops as social evils, however without accepting them as sufficient reasons for making an exception on the principle of contractual freedom. 13 In reply to parliamentary questions the government professed itself unwilling to confront a deeprooted and accepted phenomenon like pawn credit and put its hope for eliminating it on education to teach people how to achieve economic self-sufficiency. 14 Therefore the Act did not do much more than an overhaul of the license system for pawnshops plus new regulations for their keeping of records; their customers did not get any form of protection.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century a different form of ambivalence, one determined by class prejudices, surfaced in reactions to new forms of consumer credit. When purchasing household furniture or clothing upper strata of society received credit a matter of course, others mostly bought on tick for victuals like bread and milk or at cafés, with social control mechanisms ensuring reasonable conditions and regular repayment all around.
However, hire-purchase and installment schemes brought durable consumer goods within reach of people on low incomes, raising fears that they would use these facilities to live beyond their means and social status. These new credit forms also remained impervious to the usual mechanisms of social control, while getting a dubious reputation because the seller-creditor's power over buyer-borrowers was seen as conducive to one-sided conditions and usury. 15 Belgian legislators tackled these credit forms from the perspective of usury, defined in the 1865 Act concerning money lending as a misdemeanour, both for professional lending and for consumer credit. 16 As the law put it, the rise of consumer society toonaangevend en springlevend (The Hague 2008) for an overview. lenders committed usury when they misused a borrower's needs, weaknesses, passions, or ignorance to obtain, on behalf of themselves or others, an interest rate exceeding the normal rate and the cover for the loan's risk. 17 Therefore this concept of usury consisted of two elements, a subjective and an objective one.
On the one hand the creditor must knowingly misuse a borrower's weaknesses, for instance by exploiting a penurious situation to negotiate a higher interest rate. On the other hand the interest charged may not exceed the going market rate plus, depending on the case, a surcharge covering a borrower's insolvency risk. A poorer borrower thus needs to pay more interest than financially sound ones, because the lender runs a higher risk of non-payment. 18 One potential source of usury, compound interest or 'anatocism', was given particular attention. When in arrears borrowers had to pay not just interest over unpaid installments, but also over unpaid interests due, which could lead to a rapidly spiralling debt. 19 For that reason Belgium bound compound interest to tight regulation. Only interest due over actual sums borrowed could be subject to new interest charges, and then under very strict conditions, that is to say in fulfilment of a court order or a special transaction, if and when that order or transaction concern interests due for a minimum of one whole year. 20
Though curbing the usury associated with the new forms of consumer credit formed an equally powerful public concern in the Netherlands, the government failed to design effective legislation covering them, for two reasons. 21 First, for technical legal reasons hire-purchase and installment credit fitted badly in the commercial law system and lawyers debating the issue showed themselves better at raising objections than at finding practical solutions. Second, lawyers clung to the hallowed principle of contracting freedom and would not consider making an exception for usury, let alone consumer credit. 22 The lengthy debates highlight the deep social prejudices underlying them: in the Netherlands, as no doubt in Belgium, too, the jonker, milo, vannerom 23 Discussed at length by the leader of the Catholic party rksp, the lawyer L.G. Kortenhorst, htk, 1928 Kortenhorst, htk, -1929 constitutional principle of equality before the law mirrored a society in which class distinctions were taken for granted, as was class-bound behaviour. salesmen, for instance, have a weaker position, the more so if they need certain things and sellers know this. 77 Somebody with a strong need for money will accept conditions sooner than a borrower without pressures of time or money. 78 Distance to sellers means buyers need extra protection, because as a rule they cannot really see, let alone test, the goods or services. 79
Consumers may also become more vulnerable as a consequence of how they handle information. They do not always act with perfect rationality, they may possess sufficient information, yet fail to act accordingly, for instance because they underestimate the likelihood of loss of income through illness or job loss. 80 Finally a specific group of vulnerable consumers were recognized, i.e. people of whom it could be expected that their mental or physical handicap, their age, or their gullibility exposed them more than others to the risks of particular trade practices or products. 81 As it turned out it proved not always easy to delineate this target group from the average consumer. 82 The divergence in protection levels between member states made the eu realize that consumer protection should be raised to a higher level all around. A new guideline, adopted in 2008, retained the functional definition of credit transactions of the previous one. 83 As a result the guideline's coverage was extended to wage claims, the partial transfer of future income for a lower amount than will be paid, and to new products the rise of consumer society The new guideline also testified to a changed conception of consumers.
On the one hand lenders were put under fairly comprehensive mandatory rules of behaviour, including information duties both in publicity and prior to closing a transaction. 86 Transactions also needed to be entered on standard forms disclosing the lender's identity, and detailing the loan's terms and conditions such as particular form, duration, and cost, and the borrower's options to early repayment or cancellation. Lenders must thoroughly inform themselves about borrowers' creditworthiness and ensure that they do not overburden themselves with debt; if transactions appear irresponsible, lenders should not enter into them. Those mandatory duties run more or less parallel to the particular fiduciary duties which the courts, prompted by cases about complex financial products, imposed on their providers from the 1990s onwards. the purpose of campaigns to improve consumer protection. Therefore the search for alternative forms of consumer protection must be continued, if only because it is a fact that people find it difficult to improve their financial skills. 94 
Conclusion

